


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Director of
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Intelligence

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


National Intelligence Daily (Cable)

31 January 1979

State Dept. review completed

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BRIEFS AND COMMENTS

FRANCE-SPAIN: Basque Policy

The French Government announced yesterday that it would no longer accord Spanish Basques political refugee status. This change in policy is not likely to prevent terrorists from crossing the French border, but will give a boost to Spanish Prime Minister Suarez and his struggle against the Basque terrorist organization ETA. As an earnest of their resolve, the French yesterday expelled seven Basques and rounded up 20 more.

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Madrid has long charged that fleeing ETA members slip across the border and live openly in southern France as "political refugees." When Franco ruled Spain, Paris used its lenient policy toward Spanish Basques as a protest against his regime. The French became uncomfortable during the past two years, however, as Madrid established a democratic parliament and constitution. French officials yesterday referred to the Basque refugee status as "obsolete."

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After ETA stepped up its attacks in Spain and the Spanish military grew restive over the government's apparent inability to contain the terrorists, Spanish Foreign Minister Oreja flew to Paris earlier this month to seek French cooperation. Domestically, the apparent success of his mission will help Suarez in the period leading to the legislative election on 1 March by creating the impression that his government can rally international support for the war against ETA.

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
SYRIA-IRAQ: Results of Talks

Syrian President Assad and Iraqi political leader Saddam Husayn ended three days of talks in Damascus yesterday with vague pledges of closer defense cooperation and of further study of formulas to achieve Baath Party unity. Iraqi Foreign Minister Hammadi said much work remains to be done in reaching agreement on a "unity formula" and implied that Syrian and Iraqi leaders may not meet again for several months. These pledges fall considerably short of real military or political integration, and a rumored meeting between Assad and Iraqi President Bakr early next month now seems unlikely.

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RHODESIA-BOTSWANA: Airlift

The US Embassy in Botswana is concerned that Rhodesian security forces may attempt to disrupt the airlift of some 10,000 Rhodesian refugees from Botswana to Zambia scheduled to begin tomorrow. Botswanan officials have sought South African intercession with Rhodesia after receiving private warnings from Rhodesian sources against carrying out the airlift, which will be made up predominantly of military age males who will join the Zambian-based Zimbabwe African People's Union. Rather than extend the conflict into Botswana, the Rhodesians may wait until the refugees are in Zambia before making any attacks.

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SPECIAL ANALYSIS

PAKISTAN: The Current Mood

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Pakistanis are more worried about the future of their country than they have been at any time since independence in 1947. The US Embassy in Islamabad concludes that there is widespread pessimism about where the country is heading and who will be charting the course. [REDACTED]

The prevailing mood stems from the apparent lack of solutions to the country's many domestic and foreign problems. [REDACTED]

To many Pakistanis, there may seem no way in which the country can be governed effectively. In the last three decades, Pakistan has had presidential, parliamentary, and military rule, several different versions of federalism, and both free and carefully controlled elections. None of these has led to lasting governmental stability, prevented periodic outbreaks of civil disorder, or lessened regional and ethnic tensions. [REDACTED]

The Alternatives

Pakistan is now ruled by a general with limited popular support and declining prestige. The alternatives to him are:

- Some other general.
- A civilian government under some new leader.
- The return to power of former Prime Minister Bhutto.
- The institution of Islamic rule. [REDACTED]

There are problems in every one of these alternatives. There is no reason to believe, for instance, that another general would be any better able to rule

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the country than President Zia has been. The military-- regarded as the savior of the nation when it first seized power in 1958--lost half the country's territory in the war with India after it again took over in 1969. Few Pakistanis--even in the Army--believe that a continuation of the most recent period of military rule, which began in July 1977, will solve Pakistan's problems. [REDACTED]

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There is mounting pressure for a return to civilian rule, but most prominent politicians do not attract the masses, have only a regional following, or have failed to convince the people that they can carry out their promises. Even were the military to surrender power, there is no guarantee that civilian rule, no matter what its form, would be an improvement. [REDACTED]

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Former Prime Minister Bhutto has been sentenced to death for a political murder, and the Supreme Court could announce its decision on his appeal in the next few days. The court is expected to uphold the sentence and leave the final decision to Zia. There are conflicting reports about which way Zia is leaning, but any decision is likely to increase Zia's problems and could lead to civil disorder or Zia's removal from office. [REDACTED]

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Despite the many accusations against Bhutto, he is charismatic and capable and regarded by many Pakistanis as the one man who could solve the country's problems. Many others, however, regard him as a dangerous man who is responsible for many of Pakistan's current problems. Even if he is executed he is likely to remain a divisive issue in Pakistani politics. [REDACTED]

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Some Pakistanis argue that the institution of Islamic rule is the only way to save Pakistan. Although Islam has a deep influence on most Pakistanis, it is fragmented with no strong organized leadership as it has in Iran. Pakistanis have been debating the nature of an Islamic state since independence, and politicians invariably try to portray themselves as more Islamic than their opponents. There is, however, no agreement on what would constitute an Islamic state or on the practicality of such a goal. President Zia and the politicians who now support him are attempting to institute Islamic reforms. So far these have included such things as the prohibition

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of alcohol and the institution of "Islamic punishments," such as flogging and amputation, but have not dealt with more important political and economic questions. [REDACTED]

Intractable Problems

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Adding to national pessimism is a worsening economic situation. Urgently needed reforms have been postponed for political reasons and many believe that the economy has been mismanaged. A serious balance-of-payments problem is the most pressing difficulty. Given the government's failure to address economic problems, there is not likely to be any significant improvement in the economy over the next several years. [REDACTED]

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Seemingly as intractable are Pakistan's problems with its neighbors. To Pakistan, India is still a long-term threat to independence, and Pakistanis are aware that they are falling further behind India in military power. The installation of a Marxist government in Afghanistan has greatly increased fear of Soviet designs on Pakistan, and turmoil in Iran threatens the reliability of one of Pakistan's few allies. [REDACTED]

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Pakistanis are somewhat reassured by their continuing good relations with China, but they have little hope of regaining the strong backing they had from the US until the mid-1960s. Although they see some prospects for increased US support, many believe that Washington has decided on a pro-Indian policy in South Asia. [REDACTED]

The prevailing pessimism could be exploited by a leader able to convince the people that he had the solutions to Pakistan's problems. No such leader is on the scene, and the variety of proposed solutions and the number of potential leaders with limited appeal might well serve only to deepen divisions within the nation. [REDACTED]

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